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I. INTRODUCTION
Though it is a rule established by the laws of nature and of so-
cial order, and a rule confirmed by all the records of history, that
every sovereign is supreme judge in his own kingdom and over
his own subjects, in whose disputes no foreign power can justly
interfere. Yet where a Busiris, a Phalaris or a Thracian Diomede
provoke their people to despair and resistance by unheard of
cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature,
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they lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer
claim the privilege of the law of nations.'
-Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625.
Hugo Grotius, often called the father of modem international law,
left a great legacy of ideas to the contemporary generation of interna-
tional lawyers, which can be divided into two spheres. The first part of
his legacy we tend to prize and treat with respect, the other one we con-
sider obsolete, or sometimes even dangerous.
To the former belongs, for example, the above cited idea of humani-
tarian intervention. The translation of Grotius into modern language
might be that any ruler or government loses the protection of interna-
tional law when he starts to commit serious crimes against his own
people. With regard to current international human rights law, there are
not many lawyers who would oppose this idea.
The latter and more controversial part of his legacy constitutes the
theory of "just war." Under this doctrine, "a war was lawful when fought
for a just purpose by just means."2 The problem with this doctrine was
that "it was impossible to determine in any particular case whose case
was just and whose not. As a result, the rule of bellum justum, which at
the outset was understood as a legal restraint on war, turned into the op-
posite."3 Therefore, "by the nineteenth century, the international legal
literature abandoned the 'just war doctrine' ,4 and Western civilization
moved towards the "severance of morality from law.' 5 Both domestic
and international law was built on the basis of legal positivism that
"leaves little room for moral absolutes. 6
However, "many theologians, ethicists, political scientists and occa-
sionally even international lawyers would like to revive the just war
doctrine in present-day international law.' 7 These thinkers want to estab-
lish humanitarian intervention as a modem "just cause" for war. Some
writers rightfully observe that "in many ways we have moved back to the
earlier Grotian conception insofar as we accept a universal moral order
involving human rights; gross violations of these in other countries pro-
1. HUGO GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE
AND OF NATIONS 288 (A. C. Campbell trans. 1901).
2. Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 227, 237 (2003).
3. Id. at 238.
4. Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877, 878 (2004).
5. Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Inter-
vention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHNIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 208
(J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter Holzgrefe & Keohane].
6. Id.
7. Dinstein, supra note 4, at 877.
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vide at least prima facie a 'just cause' for action."' Professor Tes6n, a
proponent of this conception, noted:
Wars should be avoided, even sometimes at considerable cost.
But some wars are just. The United Nations itself is the child of
a victory in a just war. Just wars are those that are waged in de-
fense of the only currency we all have: our basic rights and the
individual autonomy from which they derive.9
As the brutality goes on in Darfur,'° the question of the legality of
humanitarian intervention pops up again, when the legal debates follow-
ing the Kosovo intervention are almost forgotten, partly as a result of the
crisis in Iraq. The controversy over the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion, in particular unilateral intervention, has returned.
Before I arrive at my central argument, I would like briefly to reca-
pitulate the legal history of humanitarian intervention, explain its
concept, and distinguish between humanitarian intervention with and
without UN mandate. Subsequently, I will discuss the legal theories sur-
rounding unilateral humanitarian intervention.
The main topic of my Note, however, is the compatibility of unilat-
eral humanitarian intervention with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (the
Charter). Through its interpretation, I will attempt to discover whether
the Grotian idea of unilateral humanitarian intervention can survive in
the environment of contemporary international law without its "just war
appendix." I will separate this idea from its "just war justification" and
approach the question of the compatibility of such intervention with the
Charter as a legal positivist. In my interpretation of Article 2(4) of the
Charter, I will try to avoid moral principles. Instead, I will rely on the
methods described by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention)," i.e., the textual, systematic, and teleological in-
terpretations, subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, international
law, and finally, the travaux priparatoires. At the same time, I will not
leave out the current trends in international law.
In the part concerning the policy issues, I will depart from the posi-
tivist approach and discuss the reasons for and against the legalization of
unilateral humanitarian intervention.
8. Nigel Dower, Violent Humanitarianism-An Oxymoron?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MILITARY INTERVENTION 73, 82 (Alexander Moseley & Richard Norman eds., 2002).
9. FERNANDO R. TEs6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 317 (1997).
10. See news about Darfur, http://hrw.org/doc?t=africa&c=darfur; http://news.amnesty.
org/pages/sudan; http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm; http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/36028.htm.
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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II. THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Humanitarian intervention was not unknown in the pre-Charter pe-
riod. The most cited examples are the joint intervention of Great Britain,
France, and Russia in aid of Greek insurgents in 182712 and the French
intervention in Syria to protect the Christians living there in 1860-
1861.3 Nevertheless, "it is debatable, whether humanitarian intervention,
although then supported by a majority of writers, was clearly established
under the customary international law at that time."14
After the Second World War, humanitarian intervention was not in-
cluded in the Charter. The preparatory works will be described in detail
below. Because of this, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was
developed primarily by scholars. The International Law Commission
(ILC), in its commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, "s did not deal directly with the issue of
humanitarian intervention, simply stating that the "legal regime of seri-
ous breaches [of peremptory norms] is itself in a state of development."
16
The concept of humanitarian intervention is dependent on the exis-
tence of the obligations erga omnes partes, i.e., the obligations of a state
towards the international community as a whole. The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) held that "such obligations derive ... from the outlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protec-
tion from slavery and racial discrimination .,1 7 "In the event of material
breaches of such obligations, every other state may lawfully consider
itself legally injured and is thus entitled to resort to countermeasures
against the perpetrator.' '18 In the context of article 59 of the ILC Princi-
ples of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
however, such countermeasures must comply with the Charter.'9
12. SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2001).
13. Id. at 32.
14. Ulrich Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw, 927 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1992).
15. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 83, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
16. Int'l L. Comm'n, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Intentionally Wrongful Acts, 53d Sess., art. 19 (2001), reprinted in Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 292,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
17. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 33, 1 33-34
(Feb. 5).
18. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1999).
19. See Responsibility of States, supra note 15, at 13, art. 59 ("These articles are with-
out prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations.").
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Concerning the crime of genocide, the Genocide Convention con-
tains even a duty "to prevent and punish."20 The ICJ held in the Genocide
case that "the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are
rights and obligations erga omnes."' Unfortunately, article 8 of the
Genocide Convention says only that "[a]ny Contracting Party may call
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action un-
der the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate."22
Therefore, the Genocide Convention itself neither establishes an en-
forcement mechanism, nor provides for humanitarian intervention.
Turning to the definition of humanitarian intervention, the widely
accepted view is that "humanitarian intervention is a short-term initia-
tive, aimed only at stopping massive and ongoing human rights
violations. Once the violations cease, it is no longer justified.'23 This
view does not embrace any regime change. My understanding of the
concept of humanitarian intervention is broader. Although regime change
is not and must not be an objective of humanitarian intervention, I can
imagine a scenario where the removal of a Saddam Hussein-type dictator
from power is necessary in order to stop atrocities. It would make no
sense to invade a state which is committing serious crimes against its
people, only to pull out and leave the oppressive government "to finish
the job." At the same time, however, humanitarian intervention must be
clearly distinguished from intervention in the name of democracy, some-
times called "pro-democratic intervention."
24
With legal basis as a criterion for distinction, there are two basic
types of humanitarian intervention. The first is humanitarian intervention
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. To
provide a mandate for such interventions, the Security Council has pre-
viously classified humanitarian catastrophes as a "threat to the peace,"
pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter. Examples of interventions
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 1 (entry into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion] ("Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to
take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article
III.").
21. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 25, 31 (July II).
22. See Genocide Convention, supra note 20, art. 8 ("Any Contracting Party may call
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in art. HI.").
23. W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 516, 517 (2004).
24. Dino Kritsiotis, Arguments of Mass Confusion, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 233 (2004).
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authorized under this scheme are those in Somalia, 5 Haiti , and Bosnia
and Herzegovina.27 The legality of this type of humanitarian intervention
is accepted by the majority of international lawyers,28 even if some still
oppose it.
2 9
In my Note, I will deal only with the second and more controversial
category of humanitarian intervention, that without Security Council
authorization. Such intervention is often called unilateral humanitarian
intervention and also covers situations in which more than one state is
involved in the use of force. The most recent examples of this type of
intervention are the Economic Community of West African States'
(ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia in 1990-91, the operations in Iraq
since 1991 to protect the Kurdish and Shia populations, 0 the 1998 inter-
vention in Sierra Leone, again by the ECOWAS, 31 and, of course, the
1999 Kosovo intervention.
III. UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN LEGAL THEORY
The leading opinion on the legality of the unilateral humanitarian in-
tervention is that it finds no support in current international law.
32
According to this view, the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4)
of the Charter must be interpreted restrictively as allowing no exceptions
except the right of self-defense according to Article 51 of the Charter,
together with Security Council actions under Chapter VII.3  No authority
for unilateral humanitarian intervention is found in customary interna-
tional law either, because Article 2(4) of the Charter replaced all existing
25. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
26. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
27. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031
(1995).
28. See, e.g., Jost Delbruck, Commentary on International Law: A Fresh Look at Hu-
manitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992);
Michael J. Matheson, Conference: Just War and Humanitarian Intervention: Comment on the
Grotius Lecture by Prof J. B. Elshtain, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 27 (2001); Simma, supra
note 18, at 5.
29. HANS KOCHLER, GLOBAL JUSTICE OR GLOBAL REVENGE? INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 309 (2003).
30. A.P.V. Rogers, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 725, 729 (2004).
31. Leo F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine:
The ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 605 (2001).
32. E.g., CHESTERMAN, supra note 12; Delbruck, supra note 28; Louis Henkin, NATO's
Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
824 (1999); Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1005 (1998).
33. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 47-53.
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customary international rules regulating the use of force and has not
been modified by any new customary international rule.
34
Furthermore, as I explain below, this restrictive opinion finds solid
support in the travaux prparatoires of the Charter, subsequent practice
of states, and several General Assembly declarations, such as the Decla-
ration on Friendly Relations of 1970.35 In addition, the ICJ did not allow
any exceptions to the principle of non-intervention in the Corfu Chan-
nel36 and Nicaragua37 cases.
The second legal approach to unilateral humanitarian intervention is
that such an intervention is illegal but legitimate, given the unique cir-
cumstances of a particular humanitarian catastrophe. It admits that there
are situations in which the international community must act outside
positive law in ways that are nevertheless legitimate because of the de-
mands of morality and justice. 8 The "excusable breach" view3 9 was also
expressed, for example, by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
°
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel,4' and by Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, who said that "there are times when the use of force may be le-
gitimate in the pursuit of peace.' 42 This statement in particular shows the
pattern of the Grotian just war logic. This justification, however, does
34. Id. at 53-60.
35. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (October 24, 1970), [hereinafter Dec-
laration on Friendly Relations].
36. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 35 (Apr. 9) ('The Court can only regard
the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the
past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in
international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less
admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be
reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to preventing the administration
of international justice itself.").
37. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 106, 202 (June
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] ("The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every
sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass
against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of cus-
tomary international law"); id. at 108, 205 ("The principle forbids all States or groups of
States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States.").
38. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2003).
39. See Dinstein, supra note 4, at 881.
40. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 216.
41. See Simma, supra note 18, at 13.
42. U.N. Press Release, Secretary General's Statement on NATO Military Action
Against Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6938 (March 25, 1999), reprinted in JEFFREY L. DUN-
OFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED
APPROACH 893, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo2.htm.
1229Summer 20051
Michigan Journal of International Law
not imply "that the system as a whole, or even the particular rule that is
violated, is in need of improvement."43
The "illegal, but legitimate" approach, which rests on arguments of
justice, morality, or necessity, comes more from the world of political
science or philosophy than from international law. If we start to create
exceptions, will we really be able to talk about something like the inter-
national rule of law? Nevertheless, it is one of the possible ways to
resolve the legal dilemma between human rights protection and the
Charter rules on the use of force.
The third approach attempts to assert the legality of unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention, on the presumption that customary international
rules allowing self-help survived the Charter and exist in parallel with
it.44 Although the ICJ held in Nicaragua that the Charter "by no means
covers the whole area of regulation of the use of force in international
relations,, 5 and that treaty-law and customary international law "retain a
separate existence, 46 this theory does not seem to be very convincing.
All customary international law regulating the use of force in contradic-
tion with Article 2(4) and other Charter provisions ceased to exist after
the Charter had been adopted. In this context, Article 2(4) can be
viewed as the lex posterior. Otherwise, the Charter would have very lim-.
ited legal significance. Moreover, it cannot be said for sure that unilateral
humanitarian intervention was clearly part of pre-Charter customary in-
ternational law.48
The fourth opinion also uses customary international law to defend
the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. This time, however,
the legal basis is not an old rule of customary international law, but
rather a new emerging rule. In theory, the Charter could be changed by a
new rule of customary international law, which conforms to the general
maxim of lex posterior derodat priori9 Such a rule "derives its law
hallmark through the possession of two elements: (i) a material and (ii) a
psychological element, ' i.e., state practice and opiniojuris. Therefore, anew rule of the right or even obligation of unilateral humanitarian inter-
43. Allen Buchanan, From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International
Reform, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, MORAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 123, 124 (Alexan-
der Jokic ed., 2003).
44. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 53.
45. See Nicaragua, supra note 37, at 94, 176.
46. Id. at 95, 178.
47. Carsten Stahn, International Law at a Crossroads? The Impact of September 11,
62(1-2) HEIDELBERG J. OF INT'L L., 183, 229 (2002).
48. See Beyerlin, supra note 14.
49. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 56 (1997).
50. REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (4th ed. 2002).
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vention could exist, but only if those two elements are clearly estab-
lished.
In the history of the twentieth century, it is very hard to find any un-
disputed case of unilateral intervention with purely humanitarian
objectives. After the 1999 Kosovo intervention, the record becomes
complicated. The cases where other objectives played a key role include
Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Tanzanian intervention in
Uganda in 1978-9, and Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1978-
79.5 The 2003 invasion of Iraq was not justified as humanitarian and
certainly does not fulfill the requirement of consistent state practice.
Opinio juris is even harder to prove. As I have already stated above
in the case of Kosovo, some leading NATO members made clear that
they considered this intervention to be an exception that should not be
repeated in the future.52 Only Belgium even mentioned humanitarian in-
tervention, and then merely as a possible legal justification.53
It is obvious that such state practice and opinio juris fulfill neither
the criteria specified by the ICJ in the Nicaragua14 and North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf55 cases nor the definitions provided by legal theory.56 In
addition, if any new customary international law should modify the
Charter in the future, it would need to be crystal clear and undisputed, as
the Charter is a treaty of constitutional importance.
The last legal opinion on unilateral humanitarian intervention, claim-
ing that this type of intervention is compatible with Article 2(4) of the
Charter,57 is the main subject of this Note. This controversial approach is
sometimes criticized as the "Orwellian school of interpretation. '
51. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Humanitarian Intervention after September 11, 2001, in JUST
INTERVENTION 192, 195 (Anthony F Lang ed., 2003).
52. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12; Simma, supra note 18.
53. Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 32 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231, 1239 (1999).
54. See Nicaragua, supra note 37, at 97-100, 183-190.
55. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., ER.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, IT 75-
81 (Feb. 20).
56. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22, para. 17 (1st ed. 1905) ("Jurists
speak of a custom, when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up
under the aegis of the convictions that these actions are legally necessary or legally right.").
57. Anthony D'Amato, U.S. Force In Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights
Activists?: The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
516 (1990).
58. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 53.
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IV. UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE CHARTER
A. Subject and Method of Interpretation
It was suggested above that unilateral humanitarian intervention is
compatible with Article 2(4)' 9 of the Charter. Under this theory, such in-
tervention violates neither the territorial integrity nor the political
independence of any State, as its objective is to stop the atrocities and
not to annex part of the State's territory or create a dependent colonial
government. Furthermore, unilateral humanitarian intervention is not
"inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations," as stated in the
preamble of the Charter. Is such a conclusion supported by careful inter-
pretation of the Charter?
The Charter is sometimes called the "constitution" of the interna-
tional community. This conclusion is usually made for three reasons.
First, the Charter "is a constituent instrument defining the structure of
the Organization... and the rights and duties of its members. Second, it
was intended to endure not just for present, or for foreseeable future, but
for 'succeeding generations.' 60 Third and finally, pursuant to Article
103, it provides for its own primacy over other treaties.6'
In spite of its importance, the Charter is technically a multilateral
treaty subject to regular treaty interpretation according to customary in-
ternational law. The Vienna Convention cannot be applied retroactively
pursuant to its article 4,62 but articles 31 and 32 can be taken to reflect
customary international law; such view was affirmed by the ICJ. 63 In ad-
dition, article 5 of the Vienna Convention states that it applies to "any
59. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the
Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: ... 4. All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
60. Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
61, 116 (1989).
61. U.N. Charter art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.").
62. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 4 ("Without prejudice to the application of
any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under interna-
tional law independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such
States.").
63. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 839 (2003).
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treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organiza-
tion."64
Therefore, in the following interpretation of the Charter, I will rely
on article 31 of the Vienna Convention,65 providing for the textual, sys-
tematic, and teleological interpretation, and additional tests, and on
article 32 of the Vienna Convention,6 providing for supplementary
methods. Although it is possible to use the guidance of the Vienna Con-
vention, it is still true that "treaty interpretation is not an exact science
but an art" 6 7 Sir Fitzmaurice called it a "subject of acute debate and con-
troversy,'" 68 which is exactly the case in the interpretation of Article 2(4)
of the Charter.
B. Textual Interpretation
The key words of Article 2(4) of the Charter are the terms "territorial
integrity" and "political independence." Pursuant to article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention, a treaty shall be interpreted "in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty."
69 And "[t]he
usual method of ascertaining this "ordinary meaning" is by recourse to
dictionaries."7°
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "integrity" as "[t]he condi-
tion of having no part or element taken away or wanting; undivided or
unbroken state.",7' These words imply that the term of integrity has to be
read as inviolability.72 It is difficult to imagine a military action, such as
an aerial bombing, that would not violate territorial integrity. After a ma-
jor military operation, a state hardly remains "unbroken." Therefore, the
expansive view of territorial integrity seems to be closer to the "ordinary
meaning" than the restrictive one, which claims that when force is used
against a state in the form of a humanitarian intervention, such state does
not lose any part of its territory.
7 3
64. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 5 ("The present Convention applies to any
treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization and to any treaty
adopted within an international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the
organization.").
65. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31.
66. Id. art. 32.
67. T. 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 72 (1974).
68. Sloan, supra note 60, at 95-96.
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31, para. 1.
70. Bothe, supra note 2, at 229.
71. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1066 (J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds., 1989).
72. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A COMMENTARY 106, 117 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
73. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Use of Force, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1246, 1251 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1992) ("Incursion into the territory of another
State by armed force, for example, remains an offence against Article 2(4), even if there is no
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"Independence," pursuant to The Oxford English Dictionary defini-
tion, means "[t]he condition or quality of being independent; the fact of
not depending on another; exemption from external control or support;
freedom from subjection, or from the influence of others; individual lib-
erty of thought or action. 74 Black's Law Dictionary states that
"independence" is "a country's freedom to manage all its affairs,
whether external or internal, without control by other countries."75
As I pointed out earlier, in order to conduct an effective humanitar-
ian intervention, regime change might be necessary. In such a situation,
before the legitimate government is created, there would surely be at
least a short period of time when the country in question would have to
be ruled by some kind of provisional administration, A la the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq.76 As a result of this, the country would not
be exempted "from external control or support" or "from the influence of
others." Therefore, the "ordinary meaning" of the terms of territorial in-
tegrity and political independence do not endorse the unilateral
humanitarian intervention.
This expansive approach to Article 2(4) of the Charter was also
taken by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case:
The United Kingdom argued that a minesweeping operation
"threatened neither the territorial integrity nor the political inde-
pendence of Albania. Albania suffered thereby neither territorial
loss nor any part of its political independence." Though the ar-
gument was not specifically addressed in the judgment, the
Court's finding that the operation violated Albanian sovereignty
impliedly rejects it.77
The second question is how to interpret the second, ambiguous part
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. The words "or in any other manner incon-
intent to deprive the other State of a part of its territory, and the aim of the incursion is a tem-
porary and restricted one, with the prompt withdrawal of troops.").
74. "Independence," in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 71, at 847.
75. "Independence," in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (8th ed., 2004).
76. See updates to JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS (2002), http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty
/drwcasebook/updatesl3.htm ("The United States and its coalition partners established an
interim government, called the Coalition Provisional Authority ('CPA'), to run Iraq in the
aftermath of the war. According to the United States and the United Kingdom, the goal of the
CPA is 'to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weap-
ons of mass destruction.' On May 6, 2003, President Bush named L. Paul Bremer III, former
ambassador and State Department counterterrorism director, as U.S. civil administrator of
postwar Iraq. Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12, 2003."); more information available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/.




sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" might have an inclusive
meaning, that any other use of force is also illegal,78 or an exclusive one,
that the use of force consistent with the purposes of the UN is legal. Un-
der a purely textual interpretation, both conclusions are possible. This
ambiguity was addressed by the delegate of Brazil at the San Francisco
Conference, 9 as will be discussed below. The latter interpretation could
open the door of legality to unilateral humanitarian intervention.
C. Systematic Interpretation
Systematic interpretation is based on the "context" of other treaty
provisions. Together with Article 2(4), other Charter articles must be
analyzed. Unilateral humanitarian intervention must be matched with the
obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means pursuant to Article 2(3),
with the notion of domestic jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2(7), with
General Assembly declarations, and also with the powers of the Security
Council pursuant to Article 24(1). The relations of unilateral humanitar-
ian intervention with the purposes of the UN according to Articles 1(3)
and 55 and the preamble of the Charter will be examined in the section
on teleological interpretation.
Article 2(3) of the Charter imposes on UN members the duty to set-
tle their disputes by peaceful means, "in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." 80 Nevertheless,
sometimes a state, through genocide or other crimes under international
law, endangers "international peace and security, and justice," and re-
fuses to settle the problem "by peaceful means." Since Article 2(3) deals
with "international peace and security, and justice," it would make no
sense to interpret this provision as a shield for those who commit these
crimes and endanger "peace, security, and justice." In a situation where
all diplomatic means have been exhausted, ius cogens rules concerning
the basic rights of human beings must take precedence over Article 2(3),
according to the general principle of lex superior derogat inferiori.
Article 2(7) of the Charter prohibits the UN from intervention
"within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."'" This provision, related
78. See, e.g., id. at 52; Simma, supra note 18, at 2.
79. BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A FRESH LEGAL
APPROACH BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD RELIGIONS 346 (2002).
80. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 ("All Members shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.").
81. Id. art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
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to the doctrine of state sovereignty, deals only with the relationship be-
tween the UN and the States. Therefore, Article 2(7) itself is not a legal
impediment to unilateral humanitarian intervention, which is by defini-
tion conducted by one or more States against another State without UN
participation.
Nonetheless, unilateral humanitarian intervention is in conflict with
the international customary law principle of non-intervention, the Gen-
eral Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, 2 and the 1981
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention.83 These resolutions
cover relations among States.
The often-cited Declaration on Friendly Relations contains "the
principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter."84 The
language of the Declaration seems to be analogous to Article 2(7) of the
Charter, but in fact, "it clearly goes beyond the various Charter provi-
sions of Article 2."85 In particular, the Resolution defines more broadly
the scope of domestic jurisdiction. 6 Under the Resolution, unilateral
humanitarian intervention is prima facie illegal. But is this Resolution
consistent with current customary international law?
"The concept of domestic jurisdiction signifies an area of internal
State authority that is beyond the reach of international law.' 87 There is
no doubt that the "area of internal State authority ... beyond the reach of
international law" is much smaller today than it was in 1945. Surpris-
ingly, it is hard today to find an internal affair of a State that would be
completely beyond the reach of international law. There are certainly
matters that still fall under the category of domestic jurisdiction, and
matters that are in a "grey zone," and matters that are no longer consid-
ered a domestic-jurisdiction issue at all, such as genocide.8 In this
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII").
82. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 35.
83. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9,
1981).
84. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 35 (third of seven principles
proclaimed).
85. Anthony D'Amato, Domestic Jurisdiction, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1090, 1093 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1992).
86. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 35 ("No State or group of States
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.").




extreme situation, however, the defense of domestic jurisdiction or state
sovereignty does not work.
Perhaps the most important part of the Charter that must be read to-
gether with Article 2(4) is Article 24(1), as well as all of Chapter VII.
Article 24(1) of the Charter provides for the Security Council's "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."
' 9
A unilateral action within the multilateral system of the Charter is highly
controversial under current circumstances. Speaking de lege lata, the
power to authorize humanitarian interventions belongs to the Security
Council and not to a group of states. Therefore, Article 24(1) makes uni-
lateral humanitarian intervention incompatible with the Charter.
Nevertheless, speaking de lege ferenda, customary international law or
interpretation through practice may enable bypassing of the Security
Council in the future. There are some international legal trends that can-
not be ignored.
When the ICJ dealt with Article 24 of the Charter in the Nicaragua
case, it held that "the Charter accordingly does not confer exclusive re-
sponsibility upon the Security Council for the purpose."
9 The ICJ meant
responsibility within the UN constitutional system in this case, but in an
extreme situation, when the Security Council is unwilling or unable to
protect the victims of genocide, Article 2(4) may allow transfer of part of
this responsibility back to states that are willing and able to act. The sub-
ject of transfer would not be the broad "responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security,"9' but rather a new "re-
sponsibility to protect" the people from serious human rights violations,
which was endorsed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change as the "emerging norm."
The concept of the "responsibility to protect" was first recognized by
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) and embraces three specific responsibilities: "to prevent," "to
react," and "to rebuild." 93
The ICISS was an independent body, intended to support the UN,
funded by the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, and
89. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 ("In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.").
90. Nicaragua, supra note 37, 95 (emphasis omitted).
91. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
92. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 57, para. 203,
U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.
93. Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, at XI (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report], at http://www.iciss.ca/
pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
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Switzerland, and various foundations. Its mandate was to promote a
comprehensive global debate on the relationship between intervention
and state sovereignty. The ICISS reported back to the UN Secretary-
General and the international community on this issue in December
2001 . The ICISS report relies on two principles:
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the
state itself.
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect.
95
According to its report, the ICISS "is in absolutely no doubt that
there is no better or more appropriate body than the Security Council to
deal with military intervention issues for human protection purposes. It
is the Security Council which should be making the hard decisions in the
hard cases about overriding state sovereignty."96 At the same time, the
ICISS admits, however, that if the Security Council "fails to discharge its
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for
action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity
and urgency of that situation-and that the stature and credibility of the
United Nations may suffer thereby."9'
The transfer of the "responsibility to protect" would function as an
emergency measure of the UN framework. Such customary international
rules or interpretation through practice, however, have not yet developed.
D. Teleological Interpretation
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention also provides for teleological
interpretation, i.e., interpretation of a treaty "in the light of its object and
purpose." Article 2 of the Charter refers twice to "Purposes," first in the
initial sentence and then in paragraph 4 itself. One of the purposes of the
UN is, pursuant to Article 1(3) of the Charter, as follows:
To achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian char-
94. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty website, http://
www.iciss.ca/mandate-en.asp.
95. ICISS Report, supra note 93, at XI.
96. Id at 49.
97. Id. at XIII.
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acter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion. ..98
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 55 of the Charter, "the United Na-
tions shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion." 9
On one hand, "the Charter does not mention protection, but only
promotion of human rights, and none of the UN's principal organs have
actually been established to deal exclusively with this issue."' ° On the
other hand, if we define the purpose of humanitarian intervention as pro-
tection of people from the gravest violations of human rights, then
humanitarian intervention must be compatible with the above-cited pur-
pose. In addition, the UN itself has moved, since 1945, from promotion
to human rights protection, international enforcement, and finally, to the
prevention of human rights violations.' °1
The 1993 Vienna Declaration identified protection of human rights
not only as a legitimate concern of the international community, but as a
"priority objective of the UN."''° Some writers even mention the promo-
tion of human rights as a "main purpose of the UN" and argue that
"there is a necessary link between the maintenance of peace and the re-
spect for human rights.' 0 3
Nevertheless, according to some international lawyers, the "overrid-
ing purpose''  or the "paramount goal"'0'5 of the UN is "to maintain
international peace and security" pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Charter.
Therefore, they create an artificial hierarchy among particular purposes
listed in Article 1 of the Charter.'° The text and structure of the Charter,
however, do not provide any basis for this hierarchy, except that the
maintenance of international peace and security is mentioned first.
98. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
99. U.N. Charter art. 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote: ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.").
100. MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS RE-
GIME 73 (2003).
101. Id. at 75.
102. Id. at 27.
103. See TEs6N, supra note 9, at 151-52.
104. See MALANCZUK, supra note 49, at 310.
105. See Randelzhofer, supra note 73.
106. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 52.
1239Summer 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Pursuant to article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the context shall
also comprise a treaty's preamble."7 The preamble of the Charter clearly
refers to human rights as well:
We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined ... to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small. ..08
Since respect for human rights is one of the leitmotifs of the Charter,
the maintenance of international peace and security cannot be under-
stood as the exclusive purpose of the UN. "The use of force to remedy
serious human rights deprivations, far from being 'against the purposes'
of the UN Charter, serves one of its main purposes."' ' Furthermore, by
saving lives, it "may actually further one of the UN's major objec-
tives.""0
E. Subsequent Agreements, Subsequent Practice
and International Law
1. Introductory Note
After using the textual, systematic and teleological interpretations of
Article 2(4), the treaty analysis is not yet done, since "[t]here is no hier-
archy between the various elements of article 31 of the Vienna
Convention; rather, they reflect a logical progression.""' Therefore, pur-
suant to article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, three more tests need to
be "taken into account, together with context." 112 In addition, the ILC
Commentary points out that the three elements in this paragraph (subse-
quent agreements, subsequent practice, and international law) "are all of
107. See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31, para. 2 ("The context for the purpose
of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble
and annexes.. ").
108. U.N. Charter Preamble.
109. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 151.
110. James P. Terry, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Legal Reality
and Political Pragmatism, ARMY LAW 36, 38 (Aug. 2004).
111. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 186 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31, para. 3 ("There shall be taken into ac-
count, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;




an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be considered
to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those which precede
them."' 3
2. Subsequent Agreements
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention first mentions "any subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions."" 4 No such formal agreement
with respect to Article 2(4) of the Charter has ever been made among
UN members. Theoretically, such a subsequent agreement could be con-
stituted by General Assembly resolutions, but these resolutions have a
different legal quality than the Charter, so this option is not very con-
vincing.
3. Subsequent Practice
In accordance with article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, "any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" shall be taken into
account as well. "The use of subsequent practice in the interpretation of
treaties was well established in international law prior to the work of the
ILC," and it was also one of the six interpretation principles "distilled
by Sir Fitzmaurice from the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice."' 16
Subsequent practice used to serve as evidence of original intent.'
7
This legal fiction was rejected by the ILC, and under the Vienna Conven-
tion, "it is present agreement, not original intent, indicated by practice
that is significant." 8 This conclusion is important for the interpretation
of Article 2(4), since opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention
often argue based on the original intent of the framers." 9
The next question is whose practice is relevant? The ILC wanted to
avoid during drafting "any possible misconception that every party must
individually have engaged in the practice."'120 In addition, "some writers
113. Sloan, supra note 60, at 107 (quoting International Law Commission Report).
114. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31, para. 3(a).
115. Sloan, supra note 60, at 107.
116. Id. at 108.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 109.
119. See, e.g., MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTER-
VENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo 22 (2001).
120. Sloan, supra note 60, at 110.
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have suggested that in the case of multilateral conventions a 'great ma-
jority,' rather than all, of the parties is required."'
' 2'
"Interpretation through practice is a procedure allowing flexibility
and organic growth. It is particularly appropriate for documents like the
Charter, whether we call it a constitution, a constitutional instrument or a
special treaty sui generis.'' 122 "Like subsequent agreements, parties' post-
ratification practice may reflect an implicit agreement to revise the origi-
nal treaty document.' ' 23 "Numerous examples of multilateral treaties
being modified by subsequent practice may be found in the Law of the
Sea,' ' 124 but there are also some important examples of the interpretation
through practice of the Charter as well.
The first example concerns the voluntary abstention of the perma-
nent members of the Security Council.'25 "[Pleace keeping operations,
developed by the General Assembly and subsequently followed by the
Security Council, are another example of interpretation or informal
amendment through practice."'' 26 The third example relates to the resolu-
tions of the General Assembly. Although it can only make
recommendations under the Charter, it often approves declaratory reso-
lutions.' The fourth example is the authorization of coalitions instead of
proceeding according to Article 43 of the Charter.'28
"It is unclear whether this 'general practice' amounted to an authori-
tative interpretation of the Charter, or to a modification of its provisions
by subsequent practice or by the emergence of a new rule of customary
international law.' ' 129 Even if it is sometimes difficult to distinguish "the
interpretation through practice" from customary international law in
121. Id.
122. Id. at 120.
123. Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Inter-
pretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 439 (2004).
124. CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 58.
125. See Sloan, supra note 60, at 120-21 ("Article 27(3) requires the affirmative vote of
nine members including "the concurring votes of the permanent members" for decisions on all
matters other than procedure. Practice quickly established that abstentions would not be con-
sidered vetoes. While not to be considered affirmative votes, they are in effect counted as
'concurring votes' allowing a resolution to be adopted. This firmly established practice is
variously considered either a broad interpretation or an informal amendment by subsequent
practice.").
126. Id. at 121 ("Peace keeping falls somewhere between peaceful settlement in Chapter
VI and Enforcement Action in Chapter VII, but finds no precise authorization in the Charter.").
127. Id. at 121-22 ("Nothing in the Charter authorized [the adoption of such resolu-
tions], but from its very first session the General Assembly exercised a right to adopt
declarations and has continued to exercise this right without objection. This declaratory func-
tion of the Assembly, if not inherent, has been established through interpretative practice or
amendment and is long beyond any reasonable challenge.").
128. Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior
Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 51, 54 (2001).
129. CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 59.
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statu nascendi, "[i]t is sufficient to note, for present purposes, that it may
be possible to amend the Charter in such a way, though the threshold of
requisite practice would be high."'3°
"NATO's attacks on Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo are
only the most recent notable example of intervention on humanitarian
grounds."'3 ' Moreover, most states involved in Kosovo did not invoke the
"interpretation through practice." Perhaps the only exception is the
statement of the Belgian representative made in oral pleadings in the
Legality of Use of Force case that an armed humanitarian intervention
was compatible with Article 2(4).
Other examples include India's 1971 intervention in Bangladesh,
Tanzania's 1978 ouster of Idi Amin in Uganda, France's 1979 interven-
tion in the Central African Empire, the use of force in Iraq to protect the
Kurds in 1991, and intervention by African states in Liberia and Sierra
Leone in the 1990s.1
33
In order to sustain the argument that there is such implicit revision,
"one must show that genuine cases of humanitarian intervention are not
to be treated as violations of international law, or at least that they are
not to be thrown in the same category as other clear-cut, non-
humanitarian, uses of force."'' I agree with Dinstein, who is "apprehen-
sive of any 'creative interpretation' of the Charter, unless it is supported
by consistent and uniform practice.' ' 35 Although some writers would dis-
agree, 3 6 there is no 'consistent and uniform practice' that would confirm
expansive interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Although some of
the above-mentioned interventions well might not have occurred but for
the presence of independent humanitarian goals, there is no doubt that
some of them also involved strategic or security concerns.' 37 In addition,
this is not reliable state practice of a "great majority" of UN members.
130. Id. at 60.
131. John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 743 (2004).
132. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. BeIg., Yugo. v. Can., Yugo. v. Fr., Yugo. v. F.R.G.,
Yugo. v. Italy, Yugo. v. Neth., Yugo. v. Port., Yugo. v. Spain, Yugo. v. U.K., Yugo. v. U.S.), Public
Sitting, May 12, 1999, Speech of Professor Brownlie, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iypo/iypoframe.htm.
133. See Yoo, supra note 131, at 743. For a detailed description of state practice with
regard the humanitarian intervention, see also FRANCK, supra note 5, at 216-26.
134. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 162.
135. Dinstein, supra note 4, at 879.
136. See Ts6N, supra note 9, at 175-225.
137. See NOWAK, supra note 100, at 309 ("The Tanzanian government, despite gross and
systematic human rights violations committed by Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s, did not
want the massive military invasion and subsequent overthrow of the regime to be considered a
'humanitarian intervention' (the same is true for other frequently mentioned cases, i.e. hu-
manitarian intervention in Bangladesh or Cambodia)."); Yoo, supra note 131, at 743.
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4. Relevant Rules of International Law
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Conventions refers to "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties,"
and includes "any customary law underlying the conventional rule."'38 At
the Vienna Conference, the representative of Czechoslovakia commented
on the adoption of this subparagraph:
[I]t was in the interest of the international community to take
into account the rules of international law in force at the time of
application of the treaty. Principles and institutions of law un-
derwent changes in the course of time .... A static inter-
pretation of the law could lead to misinterpretation.
39
This "principle has occasionally been referred to in the case-law of
tribunals, for instance the Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court
stated, in regard to the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, '"4 that:
The Court must take into consideration the changes which have
occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation
cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law,
through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of cus-
tomary law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.'
4'
This principle is often called dynamic treaty interpretation.'4 2 "It is
independent of the relevance of subsequent practice and calls for a solu-
tion even if there is no practice available that could advocate such a
change in the meaning of the word."'
43
The ICJ used the same method for the interpretation of a bilateral
treaty in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. In this case, the ICJ
138. MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A
STUDY OF THEIR INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS, WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF
THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES 265 (1985).
139. Sloan, supra note 60, at 107.
140. VILLIGER, supra note 138, at 264.
141. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 31, 53 (June 21).
142. Simma, Public Sitting held on November 13, in the LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
In 8-11, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igusicr2000-26.html.
143. Georg Ress, Interpretation, in Simma ed., supra note 72, at 35.
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took into account the latest developments in international environmental
law."
If the principle of dynamic treaty interpretation was used to recog-
nize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and to interpret
a treaty in the context of contemporary international environmental law,
why could Article 2(4) of the Charter not be read in connection with cur-
rent human rights law? "In the case of treaties that also operate as the
constitutional documents of an international organization, a more flexi-
ble method of interpretation would seem to be justified, since one is
dealing with an instrument that is being used in order to accomplish the
stated aims of that organization. 14' 5 Hambro also took this evolutionist
approach. He declared: "The Charter like every written Constitution, will
be a living instrument.' 4 6 In addition, "an evolutionary interpretation
was already envisaged during the San Francisco Conference."'
4 7
Since 1945, when the Charter came into force, a lot of things have
happened outside its framework. At that time, state sovereignty was still
considered to be one of the pillars of the international legal system and
there were no international institutions dealing with human rights protec-
tion (except perhaps the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals). Nowadays, the
picture of international law is much more colorful.
First, many human rights documents with different legal force were
adopted after the Second World War, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 148 and the Genocide Convention. 41 Subsequently, re-
gional systems of human rights protection were developed in Europe, the
Americas, and Africa. In particular, under the European Convention on
Human Rights, as amended by Protocol 11, an individual can bring a suit
directly against his or her own government. 150 The European Court of
Human Rights has even decided cases against states involving breaches
144. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 78, 140 (Sept.
25) ("Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind-
for present and future generations-of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and
unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of
instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration,
and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities
but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic
development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustain-
able development.").
145. See SHAW, supra note 63, at 842-43.
146. See Sloan, supra note 60, at 118.
147. Ress, supra note 143, at 36.
148. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (HI), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
149. See Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
150. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
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of human rights related to national security and torture.'5 ' Similarly pro-
gressive is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,'5 2 and there are
also the human rights protection mechanisms within the UN framework
based on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights'53 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
54
Second, humanitarian law, sometimes referred to as "parallel to the
human rights law,"'55 expanded into the sphere of non-international
armed conflict, since article 3, common to all four Geneva Conven-
tions, ' applies to any armed conflict, international or non-international.
The next significant step forward was the adoption of the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol II, which applies in all armed conflicts.'57
Third, even the ICJ has started to deal with legal issues closely re-
lated to human rights. This trend began with the Barcelona Traction
case, where the court recognized obligations erga omnes. 51 In the Legal-
ity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,"9 the ICJ
expressed its opinion on many human rights and humanitarian law prob-
lems, although its conclusion was ambiguous. In the LaGrand'1 and
Avena 1 judgments, the ICJ confirmed that the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations creates separate individual rights, even if not human
rights. Unfortunately, the human rights record of the ICJ was partly
spoiled by the Arrest Warrant judgment, where the ICJ found the Bel-
gian arrest warrant against an alleged humanitarian law violator unlawful
because of his diplomatic immunity.
62
151. See, e.g., McCann v. United Kingdom, 12 EUR. CT. H.R. 97 (1996); Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 2 EUR. CT. H.R. 25 (1978).
152. See, e.g., Simma supra note 142, para. 14.
153. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(21st Sess.), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (21st Sess.),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976).
155. JENNIFER M. WELSCH, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS 74 (2004).
156. In this context, the most important is the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
157. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (2002).
158. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 17.
159. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 254-60, at 68-87 (July 8).
160. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 494, 1 77 (June 27).
161. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 49, 124 (Mar. 31).
162. See Case Concerning the Arrest Wan-ant of 11 April 2000 (DR. Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 18-21, 51-58 (Feb. 14).
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Finally, international criminal justice has been booming during the
last decade. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals did not have
any followers for almost half a century. Then, in the 1990s, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR)
were created by Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII.,63 After
this, the so called mixed or hybrid courts, like the Special Court for Si-
erra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Cambodia, were negotiated. Into
this process fits also the establishment of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, even
if it is a domestic, not international court. "4 The most promising
achievement in the field of international criminal justice, however, is the
establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), al-
though it has limited personal and territorial jurisdiction.' 65
The international community has made remarkable progress in
bringing the perpetrators of gravest international law violations to jus-
tice. The Security Council itself created the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals. If the Security Council hypothetically refuses to stop genocide,
however, why should a majority of the international community be pre-
vented from doing so?
A group of almost one hundred states became parties to the ICC
Statute, which created a permanent court that will prosecute perpetrators
of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Why can this
group not have the right to stop these perpetrators, when the Security
Council does not act, at least on the territory of states party? Does the
international community really have to wait until the genocide is over?
This development of international law after the Second World War is
the broader context of the Charter; therefore, Article 2(4) must be read
together with this corpus of international human rights and humanitarian
law.
F. Historical Interpretation
Pursuant to article 32 of the Vienna Convention, supplementary
means of interpretation may be used when article 31 "leaves the meaning
163. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
164. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human-rights/
Statute.htm.
165. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9
(1998), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intflibrary/about/officialjournalURomeStatute-
120704-EN.pdf.
1247Summer 20051
Michigan Journal of International Law
ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable."'"
The travaux preparatoires seem more to support the restrictive in-
terpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, but there is some ambiguity as
well. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Four Powers agreed on the
provision, which simply read: "All members of the Organization shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.' ' 67 At the
San Francisco Conference,
Norway proposed to amend the provision to require member
states to refrain from the threat of force or any use of force "not
approved by the Security Council as a means of implementing
the purposes of the Organization"-thus explicitly affirming that
only Council authorized threats or uses of force were exempt
from the prohibition."6
The Norwegian amendment was rejected, which is used as an argu-
ment by the proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
169
Subsequently, Australia suggested that the words "against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any member state" be added to the
text.°"0
The Australian amendment "provoked considerable discussion."
One issue that provoked such discussion was the potentially
open-ended character of the language of Article 2(4). The dele-
gate of Brazil said that the change, made in the text to
incorporate the Australian amendment had not removed the ele-
ment of ambiguity ... and he suggested that ... the text as it
stood at present might well be interpreted as authorizing the use
of force unilaterally by a state, claiming that such action was in
accordance with the purposes of the Organization. 171
166. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 32 ("Supplementary means of interpretation:
"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpreta-
tion according to article 3 1:
a. Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
b. Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.").
167. LEPARD, supra note 79, at 345.
168. Id. at 346.
169. See TEs6N, supra note 9, at 154.
170. LEPARD, supra note 79, at 346.
171. Id. at 346-47.
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The Australian amendment was adopted, and the drafting committee
in its final report explained that "the unilateral use of force or similar
coercive measures is not authorized or admitted 1 7 2 This conclusion also
confirms one of the first commentaries of the Charter, published just one
year after the Conference in San Francisco:
First of all it is stated, although this is the last part of the para-
graph, that it is only force in a way inconsistent with the
Purposes of the Charter, which is forbidden. This means that the
threat or use of force is permitted in connection with the applica-
tion of measures of collective security.
7 3
Surprisingly, a later addition of this commentary speaks in the same
place about "a wide range of possible interpretations.' 74
According to Professor Tes6n, "one can even argue that the fresh
memories from the Holocaust would have led the framers to allow for
humanitarian intervention, had they thought about it,'
' 7 since Nurem-
berg's human rights message should not be 
underestimated. 76
Nevertheless, it seems that the framers of the Charter discussed this is-
sue, at least in general terms. At the San Francisco Conference, France
had proposed an amendment to the draft Charter that would have author-
ized states to intervene in another state, "even without authorization of
the Security Council, when "the clear violation of essential liberties and
human rights constitutes a threat capable of compromising 
peace. ' '177
This was rejected, however, in spite of relatively fresh memories of the
horrors of the Second World War.
Although the travaux pr~paratoires indicate a broad meaning for the
prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter, in the sec-
tion dealing with state practice, I mentioned a few developments that
were also not envisioned during the preparatory works of the Charter and
today, the legality of these "legal innovations" is not questioned. One
day, this might be the case for unilateral humanitarian intervention as
well.
172. Id.
173. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 67-68 (1946).
174. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO & ANNE P. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 51-52 (1969).
175. TES6N, supra note 9, at 155.
176. Id.
177. FRANCK, supra note 5, at 207.
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V. POLICY REMARKS: OPENING PANDORA'S Box?
For an international lawyer who believes that a government cannot
do to its own people whatever it wants to, the legalization of unilateral
humanitarian intervention is a tough dilemma.
The opponents of this type of intervention equate its legalization to
the "opening of a Pandora's box."'78 They cite the ICJ's half-century-old
dicta from the Corfu Channel case, 7 9 stating that intervention would be
reserved for the most powerful states. They further warn against the dan-
ger of abuse of the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention, giving
examples from the history of the twentieth century to support this argu-
ment. They are skeptical about any use of force invoking humanitarian
reasons, as stated by Carl Schmitt: "The concept of humanity is an espe-
cially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its
ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperial-
ism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of
Proudhon's: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat."' 8'
It is true that the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention could
be abused. Nevertheless, any right can be abused. A very good example
is the right of self-defense, which was often abused by states in the last
century.112 Is the possibility of abuse a reason for abolishing this right?
No state has ever raised this question.
In addition, the opponents stress in a Kantian way' 83 the importance
of preservation of the international legal order established by the Char-
ter:
Whatever may be the idealistic rhetoric by which military ac-
tions are justified, the system of norms ensuring the peaceful co-
existence among nations-what has been known essentially as
the "international rule of law"-will not only be gradually un-
dermined but will finally collapse if an equivalent to the old jus
ad bellum is introduced into international relations. This fact
178. See KOCHLER, supra note 29, at 305.
179. See Corfu Channel, supra note 36.
180. Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1021 (1998) ("The most notorious invocation of the right of humani-
tarian intervention in modem history occurred when Adolf Hitler claimed that German force
was necessary to protect the ethnic Germans resident in Czechoslovakia.. ").
181. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 54 (George Schwab trans., 1996).
182. E.g., the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria; the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethio-
pia; ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 31, 37 (1995)
(discussing the 1961 Indian invasion of Goa); PIERRE-MARIE DupuV, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 439 (1995) (addressing the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
183. See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSAL
30-32 (Helen O'Brien trans., 1927).
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cannot be denied, whether the principle is introduced under the
pretext of "crisis response operations". or of outright "hu-
manitarian intervention.' t
Therefore, according to the opponents of humanitarian intervention,
without Security Council authorization, the only result of its legalization
would be the weakening of the restraints on the recourse to force and
"fragmentation and regionalization of the international security sys-
tem."'85 Unfortunately, those who oppose unilateral humanitarian
intervention suggest only vague alternative solutions, or more often, no
solutions at all.
186
The UN has been relatively successful in some areas, such as post-
conflict reconstruction and nation-building.'87 On one hand, the events in
Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that the UN's coordinated ef-
fort can be inefficient under circumstances where immediate executive
action is needed. On the other hand, NATO's air attacks on Bosnian Serb
forces in 1995 produced proposals for the Dayton peace talks.'
88 Simi-
larly, the Kosovo campaign proved to be successful in ending incidents
of mass atrocities against the civilian population.89
Although unilateral use of force might be a solution to the problems
of the world, with the U.S. as the only superpower, in the future, there
might be a different superpower or the U.S. might abandon the ideals for
which it stood in the last century. Therefore, priority should be given to
the procedures under Chapter VII of the Charter and its possible reforms.
The High-level Panel Report may be a start.' °
The ICISS made the following proposal: "The Permanent Five
members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto
power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to ob-
struct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for
human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority sup-
port."'9' It is hard to imagine such an agreement under the current
situation, but the international community may find some other way
around this dilemma.
184. KOCHLER, supra note 29, at 301.
185. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 236.
186. See, e.g., CHESTERMAN, supra note 12; K6CHLER, supra note 29.
187. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Socie-
ties, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76 (2001).
188. Joseph C. Sweeney, The Just War Ethic in International Law, 27 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1865, 1887 (2004).
189. Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the
Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677 (2004).
190. See High-level Panel Report, supra note 92.
191. See ICISS Report, supra note 93, at XIII.
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The system of collective security, however, makes sense only if it
works. It is likely that during the twenty-first century, the Security Council
will again be unable to solve Darfur-type crises, since in the contemporary
global world, it is very hard to find a place on the Earth where none of
the permanent members of the Security Council has interests.
The best example is the position of the superpowers towards the cur-
rent events in the Sudan. U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell declared
that genocide is being committed in Darfur.19 2 "Never before has a sover-
eign nation invoked the Genocide Convention to characterize another
conflict. This was partially due to fears that the Convention required ac-
tion to 'prevent' genocide from all its signatories.' 93
But would China, for example, authorize humanitarian intervention
against the Sudanese government? Probably not, given the oil conces-
sions granted to Chinese companies by that very government in Southern
Darfur."M Such sensitive questions sometimes do not even reach the Se-
curity Council because the result is known beforehand. Nonetheless,
"genocide is an on-going process that can be stopped."' 95
If the international community fails to reform the UN, it may legal-
ize unilateral humanitarian intervention either by developing customary
international law or by re-interpretation of the Charter through practice.
One of the possible changes is to abolish the veto of the permanent
members for cases of genocide.
Unilateral humanitarian intervention would not necessarily cause the
destruction of the UN system, even if it could further decrease the role of
Security Council. The Security Council might be forced to deal with
more issues than it deals with now. It would be aware that if it does not
act, others would. Thus, the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention
might paradoxically revive the Security Council.
Should the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention be estab-
lished, the exercise of this right would have to be subject to strict
limitations that could be prepared by the ILC and then passed at least as
a General Assembly resolution, like the Draft Articles on Responsibility
192. Secretary Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 9, 2004), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powelU
remarks/36042.htm ("When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, and then put it
beside other information available to the State Department and widely known throughout the
international community, widely reported upon by the media and by others, we concluded, I
concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and
the Jingaweit bear responsibility-and that genocide may still be occurring.").
193. Jamal Jafari, "Never Again," Again: Darfur the Genocide Convention, and the
Duty to Prevent Genocide, 12(1) HuM. RTS. BRIEF 10 (2004).
194. Oil Concessions in Central & Southern Sudan, http://www.rightsmaps.com/html/
sudmap2.html.
195. Jafari, supra note 193, at 8.
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for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The ILC could use as a basis the re-
port of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty. 196 The following general limitations would have to be im-
posed on unilateral humanitarian intervention:
First, a declaration of an independent international institution that
serious breaches of humanitarian law have been committed, such as
genocide and crimes against humanity, should be required. "G. Robert-
son has suggested that a declaration by judges of the ICC formally
confirming its prosecutor's indictment of the head of the offending gov-
ernment might provide the trigger."' 97 Nevertheless, it is questionable
whether such declaration would also operate against non-party states and
whether it would not be too late. The determination could also be made
by the ICTY or ICTR, or even by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC).
Second, all available remedies would have to be exhausted, such as
diplomatic negotiations and economic or other sanctions. This is called,
in the ICISS report, the "last resort principle."'98 The issue of humanitar-
ian intervention could then be brought to the Security Council, unless
there were a clear previous statement from a permanent member that
such a resolution will be vetoed. In case of a veto, the military operation
would be launched as a unilateral humanitarian intervention. The use of
military force would have to follow all principles of the law of armed
conflict, such as the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
Third, if it is necessary to overthrow the government in order to stop
serious breaches of international law, democratic elections and the with-
drawal of the intervention forces should be accomplished as soon as
possible and with broad UN involvement, since "[m]ilitary force is more
likely to be effective in stopping atrocities and restoring basic security
than in addressing the underlying factors that lead to atrocities."'"
VI. CONCLUSION
Dealing with the different types of humanitarian intervention, I drew
a distinction between humanitarian interventions authorized by the Secu-
rity Council and those without UN mandate. While the legality of the
former is now widely accepted, the legality of the latter is being dis-
cussed. In my note, I concentrated primarily on the question of whether
196. ICISS Report, supra note 93, at XII.
197. CHESTERMAN, supra note 12, at 229.
198. See ICISS Report, supra note 93, at XII.
199. Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, in Holzgree & Keohane,
supra note 5, at 269.
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unilateral humanitarian intervention is compatible with Article 2(4) of
the Charter.
In the introduction, I stated that the Grotian idea of unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention comes from the "just war doctrine," which is
based on both legal and moral grounds. As a result of its origin, this in-
tervention wrestles with the positivist system of international law and the
Charter, its constitution. I attempted to separate the idea of unilateral
humanitarian intervention from its just war "life jacket," to see whether it
can survive alone on the "seas" of Article 2(4). The outcome of my in-
quiry is that it cannot.
As a basis for the analysis of Article 2(4), I used the Vienna Conven-
tion. First, I started with the textual interpretation and I found that the
ordinary meaning of the terms "territorial integrity" and "political inde-
pendence" is incompatible with unilateral humanitarian intervention.
Nevertheless, the last part of Article 2(4), referring to the use of force "in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN," can be un-
derstood either as allowing or prohibiting unilateral humanitarian
intervention.
Second, within the systematic interpretation, I concentrated on the
relation of unilateral humanitarian intervention to Articles 2(3), 2(7), and
24(1) of the Charter, and also on General Assembly resolutions. Article
24(1) in particular, which provides for the Security Council's "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,"
makes unilateral humanitarian intervention incompatible with the Char-
ter.
Third, I focused on the purposes of the Charter and concluded that
there is no hierarchy among them. The maintenance of international
peace and security cannot be understood as the exclusive purpose of the
UN in the twenty-first century.
Then I moved to the specific tests under article 31(3) of the Vienna
Convention. First, I have not found "any subsequent agreement" among
the UN members on the interpretation of Article 2(4).
Second, I turned to "subsequent practice." In modern treaty interpre-
tation, the practice of states and international organizations plays an
important role.2 ° Furthermore, in cases of the constitutional documents
of an international organization, the concept and nature of subsequent
practice possesses an added relevance.0 ' I did not find, however, the con-
sistent and uniform practice that would serve as a basis for the
legalization of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
200. See Bernhardt, supra note 14, at 1421.
201. See SHAW, supra note 63, at 843.
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As a third test, I reviewed "any relevant rules of international law,"
in particular the development of international human rights law in the
last fifty years, which could serve as an argument for the legalization of
unilateral humanitarian intervention.
In addition, the historical interpretation also contradicts the compati-
bility of unilateral humanitarian intervention with Article 2(4) of the
Charter.
Speaking de lege ferenda, unilateral humanitarian intervention may
be legalized in the future by customary international law, interpretation
through practice, or by the formal procedure under Articles 108 and 109
of the Charter.
Speaking de lege lata, however, the international lawyers supporting
the idea of unilateral humanitarian intervention will have to rely on the
"illegal, but legitimate" approach. As Franck stated, "legal systems
worldwide accept the need for some such way out of the conundrum in
which good law, strictly enforced, conduces to a result which opens an
excessive chasm between law and the common moral sense. 20 2
This doctrine absorbs into international law the principles of moral-
ity and necessity. In the sphere of these principles, the idea of unilateral
humanitarian intervention can survive. In fact, this idea is inseparable
from these principles, as I ascertained in this Note. The ICISS, which
considers "large-scale loss of life" or "large-scale ethnic cleansing" to be
a "just cause" for humanitarian intervention, probably came to the same
conclusion.2 °3
Since the monopoly of the legal positivists has been challenged since
the end of the Second World War,'2° and a certain skepticism has begun
to gnaw at its roots,0 the "illegal, but legitimate doctrine" might be the
right answer in extreme situations.
202. FRANCK, supra note 5, at 214.
203. See ICISS Report, supra note 93, at XII.
204. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 649 (1958).
205. See FRANCK, supra note 5, at 210.
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